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Abstract 
The development path that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been following during 
the past thirty years has led to both internal and external economic imbalances, and is now 
greatly challenged by the global crisis. This unbalanced growth path was primarily a result of 
the PRC’s labor market reform which took the years of the mid-1990s as its turning point. 
Before the mid-1990s, the scale of rural-to-urban migration was limited, but it has grown 
dramatically since then. 1996 also saw drastic employment restructuring in urban areas of 
the PRC. Labor market reform, accompanied by the foreign exchange system reform in 
1994, confirmed the PRC’s comparative advantage of low labor cost, and therefore further 
increased the PRC’s reliance on exports. However, the increased income disparity that 
resulted from the labor market reform may jeopardize sustainable growth if no adjustment is 
made. To sustain the high economic growth, especially in face of the current crisis, the PRC 
needs to adjust its reform and development strategies to promote income equality. 
 
JEL Classification: J21, O15, O53 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Open economies, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), are suffering from the 
ongoing subprime crisis, which began in August 2007. This paper will discuss the role of the 
PRC in the economic crisis by providing statistical evidences in this paper about the 
consumption and savings behavior in PRC, its trade imbalances, and how this may be 
related to the current crisis. Rises in domestic consumption in the PRC have been modest 
during the past thirty years, and there has been a secular decline in the consumption-gross 
domestic product (GDP) ratio, partly because of the rising income inequality. Low domestic 
consumption, along with production overcapacity has led to overdependence on increases in 
exports for growth, and the low labor costs and the resulting comparative advantage of PRC 
products reinforces the reliance on export growth. Since the mid-1990s, the PRC has 
maintained its low labor costs through large-scale rural-to-urban migration and urban labor 
market reform, both of which furthered trends that saw the global reallocation of labor-
intensive manufacturing industries to PRC. The trade dependency ratio in the PRC is 
substantially higher compared than other economies of similar scale. Meanwhile, 
consumption in the United States (US) has been high. Through international trade, a balance 
is thus formed between the PRC’s high savings ratio and excess consumption in the US. 
What is responsible for the comparatively low labor costs in PRC? Why is the current 
economic crisis an opportunity for the PRC to alter its unbalanced development path? 
Answers to these questions are critical for both a further understanding of the linkages 
between labor market reform, PRC growth patterns, and the ongoing economic crisis, as 
well as a means to figure out better ways to sustain the PRC’s long-run growth. 
This paper will relate the current economic crisis partly to the labor market reform in PRC, 
started in the mid-1990s. Why and how the PRC should adjust its development strategy is 
also discussed. In Section 2, we explain the internal and external imbalances in the PRC 
and the impacts of the subprime crisis on the PRC economy. In Section 3, we briefly review 
what happened in the mid-1990s concerning labor market reform, while in Section 4, we 
discuss how the labor market reform has weakened labor’s market strength that allows labor 
market to function well, but also widened income disparity. Section IV will also summarize 
the potential threats posed by income inequality to economic growth. In the final section, the 
paper will explain why the PRC must adjust its labor market reform strategies in order to 
both narrow its income disparity and to sustain economic growth, especially in face of the 
current economic crisis. 
2.  THE PRC’S DEVELOPMENT PATH AND THE CURRENT 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The current economic crisis is not only a short-run shock to the PRC economy, but also a 
challenge to the PRC’s development path. The PRC has been growing rapidly since its 
initiation of the open-door policy in 1978, and the significant growth in PRC has greatly 
benefited from its low labor costs which contributes the relatively low prices of its products. 
Low labor cost is primarily guaranteed by the labor market reform and mostly responsible for 
the export-oriented development strategy in PRC. However, several potential problems are 
derived from the unbalanced growth path PRC has been following during the past three 
decades. These problems were hidden by the fast export-driven growth of GDP, especially 
during the high-growth years of 2001–2007, but they are seen explicitly in face of the current 
crisis. The unbalanced growth path has been accompanied by the process of marketization 
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reform, and led to “dual imbalances,” both internal and external,
1 which, if unadjusted, would 
undermine sustainable economic growth.
2 
The internal imbalance, depicted as a decreasing share of consumption in GDP and 
investment and export driven growth, is fundamentally related to the growing income 
inequality. As illustrated in Figure 1, the national Gini coefficient has been increasing from 
1980 to 2002, and reached around 0.45 in 2002. Though the Gini coefficient with cost-of-
living adjustment is lower, a trend of increase is still revealed. And according to Li’s recent 
estimation, the national Gini coefficient is approximately 0.48 in 2007.
3  The disparity 
between rural and urban income in the PRC, measured by Gini coefficients, has also 
steadily increased (Figure 1). It is worth noting that whereas income disparity within cities 
has tended to increase, for the nation as a whole, income disparity has fluctuated, some 
caused by the decrease in the urban–rural income gap, especially the decrease of such 
disparity around the mid-1990s (Figure 2). 
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COL= cost of living. 
Source: Ravallion and Chen (2007). 
 
                                                  
1 In Mundell (1962), the terms of internal imbalance and external imbalance are used to refer to the disequilibrium 
condition in the domestic market and the savings-investment gap respectively. Here, we use internal 
imbalance to indicate the relatively slow growth in consumption that is partly because of the widening income 
inequality. Meanwhile, external imbalance is used in our article to refer to the expansion of international trade, 
especially net exports, which has resulted in remarkable growth in foreign exchange reserves, and constitutes 
a reason for the international imbalance between the PRC and the US. 
2 From the logic of our article, to be analyzed below, sustainable economic growth could be jeopardized by rising 
income inequality in two ways. First, on the demand side, rising income inequality could harm growth because 
of low domestic consumption demand under the law of diminishing marginal propensity of consumption. 
Secondly, from the perspective of supply side factors, Wan, Chen, and Lu (2006) find that inequality has a 
strong, and negative, impact on physical investment, while its influence on human capital is positive but weak. 
Therefore, the cumulative effect of income inequality on economic growth is negative, irrespective of whether 
the horizon is short-run or long-run. 
3 Li Shi (2008). It should be noted that the PRC experienced booming capital markets in 2007, so the estimated 
Gini coefficient could be abnormally high. 
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Note: The ratio is per capita annual disposable income of urban households to per capita annual net income of rural 
households. Urban and rural incomes have been deflated by the urban and rural consumer price index (CPI), 
respectively, except for the years of 1978 to 1984, and 1986 to 1989, because of the lack of CPI data in these years.  
Sources: NBS (2008), China Statistical Yearbook 2008, National Bureau of Statistics, and the authors’ calculations. 
Widening income disparity is detrimental to economic growth and would bring about several 
consequences. First of all, as inequality rises, domestic consumption demand may grow 
more slowly. Under the law of diminishing marginal propensity of consumption, the rich, at 
the upper end of income distribution, income inequality reduces demand in a way that the 
rich tend to save more and consume less. For the poor, precautionary saving increases with 
the rise in income risks during the process of marketization. Chamon and Prasad (2008) 
attribute the rise in the PRC’s saving ratio since 1995 to precautionary motives and 
underdevelopment of financial markets. As both the rich and the poor save, the saving ratio 
of households is higher in the PRC compared with other countries. 
Figure 3 depicts the share of household consumption in GDP from 1978 to 2007, which has 
dramatically declined. In 1978, the share of household consumption in GDP was 48.8%. 
However, this share has been declining continuously since then and fell to about 35.5% in 
2007. Despite the comparatively high public investment in PRC, this continuous decline in 
household consumption is still not enough to be compensated, and therefore, it leads to slow 
growth in aggregate domestic demand. It is noteworthy that high investment growth, 
including government investment, increases domestic demand in short run, but in medium 
and long run it results in over-capacity of production that needs being absorbed by external 
demand. As can be inferred from the gross domestic production identity, given low domestic 
demand and overcapacity of production, net exports are the only way to achieve high GDP 
growth. The upward trend in the investment-GDP ratio is shown in Figure 3. Low domestic 
demand, accompanied by the high production capabilities of PRC enterprises, leads to a 
secular increase in exports. Statistics also suggests that compared to other economies of 
the similar scale, the trade dependency ratio, i.e. the sum of export and import divided by 
GDP, is particularly high in PRC which contradicts the general rule that trade dependency 
ratio is generally lower in larger economies. The trade dependency ratio in the PRC was as 
high as 66% in 2006, compared with 20–30% in other economies of similar scale. 
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Notes: 
1. GDP is calculated by the expenditure approach. 
2. Inventory is included in investment.  
Sources: NBS (2008), China Statistical Yearbook 2008, National Bureau of Statistics, and the authors’ calculations. 
Given the current system of foreign exchange in PRC, nearly all trade surpluses, foreign 
direct investment inflows, and remittances from abroad should be exchanged into yuan 
(CNY) at the banks. Therefore, the central bank needs to issue a corresponding amount of 
CNY to absorb foreign currency inflows that are thereby transformed into foreign exchange 
reserves. This increased liquidity, especially the liquidity resulting from international trade 
surpluses, was one of the reasons for both the high inflation and capital markets bubble, 
before the PRC economy was shocked by the crisis in the fall of 2008.  
In addition, large income inequality also mirrors the development pattern of the PRC 
economy which is highly reliant on low labor costs. The low labor costs in the PRC labor 
market can be accounted by three reasons. The first is the large-scale influx of rural labor 
into cities since the mid-1990s. This urbanization process met the needs of globalization and 
the reallocation of labor-intensive industries from developed economies to PRC. Though 
rural-urban migration restrictions were loosened in the mid-1980s, actual large-scale rural-to-
urban migration emerged only in mid-1990s. Throughout 1994 to 2004, the rise in wages of 
migrant workers was quite limited.
4 Secondly, massive numbers of redundant workers were 
laid off from state-owned-enterprises (SOE) as a result of labor market reform during 1996 
and 2000. This has led to more severe competition in the labor market, and thus imposed 
downward pressure on wages. Finally, low labor costs are also a result of inadequate 
protection of labor, especially for migrant workers and laid-off workers from SOEs. Many 
workers did not have contracts with employers in the private sector, so they did not receive 
social security, and so the labor costs of production were lowered. Fiscal decentralization 
and yardstick competition between local governments are primarily responsible for the poor 
labor protection, because local governments concentrate on economic growth, through 
attracting both domestic and foreign investment, while the interests of labor are overlooked. 
Therefore, when the forces of urbanization meets globalization in the PRC, labor’s market 
power is weakened, because capital can move easily across countries and regions, while 
the supply of labor is sufficient and labor mobility is less free than capital. This is the basic 
                                                  
4 This is consistent with the theory of dual economy (Lewis 1954), which predicts that a developing economy 
experiencing urbanization and industrialization has a phase of “unlimited labor supply” with limited wage 
growth. 
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reason why labor’s share in national income has declined since 1996, which will be shown 
later on. 
With low labor costs, enterprises do not have adequate incentive to innovate, as we have 
observed in the PRC. Although the country has claimed to follow an innovation-based 
development path, enterprises are reluctant to put their revenues into research and 
development, because innovation is almost always costly and risky. With inexpensive labor, 
enterprises maintain an emphasis on low costs, along with a low technology level, and 
consequently inadequate innovation. This development pattern limits firms’ demand for high-
skilled workers. Accordingly, the employment pressure of university graduates can partly be 
explained by the low wages of migrant workers in the PRC. 
Apart from the internal imbalance, the PRC economy also has an external imbalance due to 
the unbalanced growth path. The external imbalance is associated with low labor costs, 
which were not completely established until the mid-1990s. Low labor costs, together with an 
undervalued CNY since 1994, constitutes the comparative advantages of Chinese products 
in overseas markets, and has led to rising exports as well as the huge amount of foreign 
currency reserves in the PRC. According to a Morgan Stanley estimate cited in The 
Economist (2007), although wages of PRC workers rose from 2000 to 2006, increases in 
labor productivity were much larger. Therefore, the actual labor cost per unit of products 
declined significantly. In addition, empirical studies have also come to a consensus about 
the PRC’s comparative advantage in exports, especially in labor-intensive products which 
illustrate the Heckscher-Ohlin approach. For example, using international trade data of the 
PRC and the world, Yue and Hua (2002) calculate the revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) index of Chinese products. Their calculations confirm that from 1980 to 2000, the 
comparative advantage of the PRC has largely shifted from resource-intensive products to 
labor-intensive ones, and international trade has accentuated this trend. Having benefited 
from this comparative advantage, increases in PRC exports have been enormous, which is 
shown in Figure 4. Imports have also grown in the same period, but not as rapidly as 
exports. It could be seen from Figure 5 that net exports fluctuated around zero before 1994, 
but since then, exports have persistently exceeded imports. As a result, foreign exchange 
reserves have also risen steadily since 1994, especially in recent years, (see Figure 6.) 
Foreign exchange reserves in March 2009 reached 1,953.74 billion US dollars (US$), which 
is equivalent to almost one half of the country’s total GDP. Although PRC entrepreneurs 
claim that their exports to other countries are inexpensive mainly because of low labor costs 
and high productivity, rising international trade conflicts have also been seen between PRC 
and other countries. According to Stevenson (2007), the number of anti-dumping 
investigations the PRC has been the focus of ranked first of all the countries in the world. 
During the first half of year 2007, there were as many as 18 anti-dumping investigations 
against the PRC, which accounted for 30% of all anti-dumping investigations in the world 
(Stevenson, 2007). Furthermore, the rapid increase in foreign exchange reserves is also 
responsible for the PRC’s holding of US assets. At the end of December 2008, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), part of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), 
managed close to US$2.1 trillion: US$1.95 trillion in formal reserves and between US$108 
and US$158 billion in “other foreign assets.” The PRC’s state banks and the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC), PRC’s sovereign wealth fund, together manage another 
US$250 billion or so. This puts the PRC’s total holdings of foreign assets at over US$2.3 
trillion. That is over 50% of the PRC’s gross domestic product (GDP), or roughly US$2,000 
per Chinese inhabitant (Setser and Pandey 2009). 
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Sources: NBS (2008), China Statistical Abstract 2008 and National Bureau of Statistics. 
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Sources: NBS (2008), China Statistical Yearbook 2008 and National Bureau of Statistics. 
Such internal and external imbalances in the PRC, and the international imbalance between 
the PRC and the US, however, are reasonable to some extent, as long as labor productivity 
in the US can be continuously enhanced. The savings ratio in the US began to decline in the 
mid-1980s when the US began its rapid growth of information technology and labor 
productivity. Labor productivity increased more rapidly after 1995, and high productivity was 
an essential stimulus for economic growth in the US. With the increase in productivity, 
workers’ wages would tend to rise. When the expectation of an increase in future income is 
formed, to smooth consumption and maximize life-time utility, individuals would borrow to 
consume at present. Moreover, the highly developed capital market in the US has further 
encouraged this trend. Industrializing countries, like the PRC, have accumulated huge trade 
surpluses since the middle of the 1990s. Their purchases of US bonds and other US assets 
have contributed to the appreciation of these assets. In this way, these countries, including 
the PRC, have in essence shared the rapid growth of the US economy. However, one vital 
threat to the continuance of this imbalance is the question of to what extent the appreciation 
of US assets is related to the real rise in US productivity. If productivity growth can be 
sustained, high returns could be attained from the holding of US assets, and there would not 
be a significant departure of the “paper” economy from the real economy. Otherwise, risks 
may accrue to the point that adjustments would have to be made. The ongoing crisis is an 
opportunity for the PRC to make overdue internal policy changes, leading to a structural 
adjustment, so that domestic demand would increase and reduce the dependence on 
exports. As shown in Figure 7, since the third quarter of 2008, the growth rates of both 
exports and imports on a yearly basis have declined tremendously, and even fell to below 
zero after November 2008. 
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Sources: The data for January and February 2009 are from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the rest are from the 
Fast Report of China Economic Statistics (NBS 2008b). 
The economic shock has also resulted in unemployment. As Yin, the Human Resources and 
Social Security Minister, has announced, the current employment situation is disconcerting.
5 
The first point is that the number of new urban jobs has declined dramatically. The urban 
unemployment rate has risen and reached the highest level of the past three years. Second, 
finding a new job is becoming more difficult for migrant workers, and many among them 
have lost their jobs. Since September 2008, employment, especially in the export-led 
manufacturing sector in the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta, has fallen 
dramatically. Many factories were shut down during the crisis. Surviving enterprises also cut 
their employment, or asked their workers to take a “long vacation”. Most of the factory 
employees are migrant workers (Mingong) from inland rural areas. Many lost their jobs and 
went back to their hometown in the second half of 2008, especially after September. 
According to the survey results released by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security, there were over 130 million migrant workers at the end of 2008. 60% of them 
returned home for the 2009 Spring Festival, 10 percentage points higher than the previous 
year. 20 million migrant workers are seeking new jobs in 2009. Compared to the year before, 
the number of enterprises that plan to hire in the month after the Spring Festival dropped by 
12%. The overall number of vacancies was 10% lower.
6 During the annual meeting of the 
People’s Congress in March, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
announced that about half of the migrant workers returned home during the Spring Festival, 
among whom 80% returned to cities after the festival. 45 million of those migrant workers 
have found jobs, while 11 million are still unemployed. 
The economic crisis has also greatly increased employment pressure on college graduates. 
According to the estimate of the Ministry of Education, the number of college graduates was 
4.95 million in 2007, of which 1 million are unemployed. In 2008, the number of graduates 
rose to 5.6 million, of which 1.5 million are unemployed. In 2009, 6.1 million have graduated, 
which is 8.9% more than 2008. To alleviate the employment pressure, PRC has enlarged the 
                                                  
5 Yin said this and the following concerning the current employment situation at the press conference of the 
second session of the eleventh National People’s Congress, March 10th, 2009. 
6 See China Daily, 11 Feb. 2009. 
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  9
                                                
enrollment of graduate students by 5% in 2009. The number of new job opportunities in 
central government-owned-enterprises for college graduates has also doubled. The central 
government will continue to call for graduate students to work as rural village officials. More 
positions would also be provided to graduates who would like to participate in education, 
agriculture, medical service, and poverty reduction.
 
Based on the average employment elasticity to GDP ratio during 2001 to 2007, as is shown 
in Table 1, if GDP in the secondary and tertiary industries grows by 6%, then employment 
would increase by 8.57 million. Assuming that agriculture does not create more employment, 
and that the total urban labor force grows by 11 million, as in 2008,
7 2.4 million more people 
will be unemployed. This is almost the number of unemployed receiving unemployment 
insurance from the government at the end of 2008.
8 In other words, if the rate of GDP 
growth is 6%, the unemployment rate may double. However, if a GDP growth rate of 8% 
could be maintained in the PRC, 11.4 million new jobs would be created in the secondary 
and tertiary industries. Thus, the current unemployment rate may remain almost unchanged. 
This explains why PRC has set 8% as its goal of economic growth for 2009.
 
7 According to the NBS data, the urban labor force increased by 11.13 million in 2008. This data could be found 
in the Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2008 National Economic and Social 
Development, available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20090226_402540784.htm. 
8 According to the NBS data, 2.61 million unemployed people received unemployment insurance from the 
government at the end of 2008. ADBI Working Paper 162    Lu and Gao 
 
Table 1: Employment Elasticity and Employment Growth 
 Employment 
(million) 





  Secondary Tertiary Secondary Tertiary  Secondary Tertiary Secondary Tertiary
2001   162.84  202.28 8.44  10.26  0.40 2.04 0.05  0.20 
2002   157.80  210.90 9.83 10.44  -3.10 4.26 -0.31  0.41 
2003   160.77  218.09 12.67  9.50 1.88 3.41 0.15  0.36 
2004   169.20  230.11 11.11  10.06  5.24 5.51 0.47  0.55 
2005   180.84  237.71 11.70  10.50  6.88 3.30 0.59  0.31 
2006   192.25  246.14 12.97  10.76  6.31 3.55 0.49  0.33 




    11.45  10.42  3.56 3.33 0.28  0.32 
2008   211.70  256.83  9.30 9.50 2.62 3.08 0.28  0.32 
2009(growth=6 215.28  261.82  6.00 6.00 1.69 1.94 0.28  0.32 
2009(growth=8 216.47  263.48  8.00 8.00 2.25 2.59 0.28  0.32 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics and the authors’ calculations.
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3.  WHAT HAPPENED AROUND 1996? THE TURNING 
POINT IN LABOR MARKET REFORM 
As argued in the previous section, it was in the mid-1990s that the PRC established its 
growth pattern of low labor costs and high exports. That was the starting point of the large-
scale rural-to-urban migration, the radical labor market reform, and the era of an 
undervalued yuan. 
Though restrictions on rural-to-urban migration have been gradually loosened since the mid-
1980s, the scale of rural-to-urban migration was modest until the mid-1990s. The significant 
increase in the number of migrants is shown in Figure 8. With the process of urbanization 
and industrialization, migrant workers have been making up an increasingly larger proportion 
of rural labor. The inflow of rural migrants into cities intensified labor market competition, and 
therefore, weakened labor’s market power and lowered the growth of urban worker wages, 
compared with the growth of labor productivity. 
Figure 8: Rural Labor (1985-2006) (in 1,000s) 
 
TVE = township and village enterprises. 
Source: Fang Cai’s estimation and presentation at Fudan University. 
Another event that deserves our attention is related to the labor market reform which 
accelerated in 1996. Before the initiation of reform and the open door policy in 1978, the 
PRC adopted a planned employment system to satisfy the need for a “catch-up” 
development strategy. To generate revenues for the investment in the SOEs, which were 
focused on heavy industry, the government interfered in the labor market, and rendered two 
characteristics of the labor market in the planned economy: distortion of the labor price and 
segmentation of the labor market. On the one hand, the state compressed wages and 
assigned employment through the Ministry of Labor. Even if wage disparity existed among 
different industries and enterprises, such disparity could not be narrowed through labor 
market competition and labor force reallocation. On the other hand, because of the “catch-
up” development strategy, which favored capital-intensive heavy industry, demand for labor 
was relatively low, but the government attempted to eliminate unemployment by 
administrative policies. Therefore, enterprises in the PRC ended up with redundant 
employees. From the initiation of the labor contract system in 1986, up until 1996, the newly-
11 ADBI Working Paper 162    Lu and Gao 
 
grown labor force was marginally allocated through the market mechanism, but the 
employment mechanism of the labor stock, i.e. those were already employed, was not 
marketized. As a result, in this stage, the effect of labor market reform was mainly a gradual 
adjustment of income structure. More and more laborers earned income from non-state 
enterprises, and from non-wage sources. 
Starting from Shanghai in July 1996, the labor market system reform was officially initiated, 
and was marked by the establishment of the re-employment service centers for separating 
surplus SOE employees. From 1997 to 1998, this reform initiative was quickly introduced all 
over the nation. Laid-off SOE workers were required to leave their original role, and enter the 
reemployment centers to be reassigned.
9 Those laid-off workers were not included in the 
registered urban unemployment rate. As the new century descended, enterprises came to 
have more autonomy in labor employment. As now, in order to lay off employees, 
enterprises are only required to pay sufficient compensation. SOEs often carried out the so-
called “buy-outs,” with calculations based on the number of years employees had worked. 
Among those who were laid off, some found new jobs, some became unemployed, whereas 
others quit the labor market. Many found new jobs in the informal sector. Structural 
adjustment was actualized mainly as differentiation in terms of various employment statuses. 
Figure 9 plots the changes in income structure. We can see that the ratio of total employee 
wages to total income of urban residents has been steadily decreasing since 1978, as 
income from sources other than employee wages is accounting for an increasingly larger 
proportion of total income. Multiple factors could have led to this trend, such as the 
informalization of employment and the diversification of income sources. Figure 10 depicts 
the ratio of the number of urban paid employees
10 to total urban employment, which displays 
a downward trend, especially after 1996. This implies that with the deepening of labor 
market reform, employment is more informalized. Figure 11 shows the structure of urban 
workers’ employment in organizations with different types of ownerships. As we can see, the 
share of employment in SOEs and collective-owned-enterprises has declined, while 
employment in other forms of ownerships has been increasing significantly, especially after 
the mid-1990s, which indicates a diversification of employment. 
                                                  
9 Such workers received layoff wages, which were below working wages yet higher than unemployment 
insurance. At the same time, laid-off workers still kept their social security relationship with their original 
workplace and, therefore, could obtain relatively better medical insurance compared to the unemployed. 
10 Urban paid employees refers to the number of staff and workers in the China Statistical Yearbook. It 
represents employment in the formal sector. However, there are also self-employed workers and employment 
in the informal sector in urban PRC. We use this ratio to indicate the share of formal employment in all 
employment, and a downward trend is revealed which could be seen as a trend of employment informalization. 
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Sources: NBS (2008), China Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
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Sources: NBS (2008), China Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
The registered urban unemployment rate has also risen after 1997, and the increase was 
especially rapid from 2001 to 2003 (Figure 12).
11 The trend of a decreasing labor force 
participation rate is revealed in Figure 13. The falling labor force participation rate indicates 
that during the adjustment of the employment structure in the labor market, an increasing 
number of people chose to quit the market.
12 Obviously, we can conclude from the analyses 
above that after 1997, the pace of employment restructuring caused by labor market reform 
accelerated, and led to intense changes in employment and income structures. 
                                                  
11 In fact, the PRC’s registered urban unemployment rate is criticized by researchers as an insufficient index. 
This index suffers from three problems. First, it is an index of the registered unemployment rate, which is 
different from the more internationally applied surveyed unemployment rate. Second, this index only takes into 
account officially registered urban residents, whereas the floating rural population who have migrated into the 
cities are ignored. Third, and most importantly, before the merging of the dual employment systems—state and 
private sectors—in 2000–2001, the unemployment rate index did not take into consideration “laid-offs”, who 
were actually unemployed, and whose number was at one time greater than the number of those unemployed. 
As a result, this index, without doubt, substantially underestimates the actual unemployment rate in urban 
PRC. 
12 Although there were other reasons leading to the declining labor force participation rate, Cai and Wang (2004) 
also pointed out that the decline was partly a result of the fact that some "frustrated workers" quit the labor 
market. 
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Note: The labor force participation rate = (employment + unemployment)/ working age population. The working age 
population is defined as the number of urban residents whose age is between 15 and 64. The sudden rise in 1990 
was due to the change of statistical gauge; therefore, the number of employees rose sharply. 
Sources: NBS (2008), China Statistical Yearbook 2008, and the authors’ calculation. 
Labor protection is insufficient under the current system in the PRC. Although trade unions 
are nominally organizations through which workers can lawfully fight for their rights, in reality 
they are subordinate organizations established within enterprises by the Party and 
government in public sectors and SOEs. In the initial stages of SOE reform in the mid-1990s, 
chairmen of trade unions in some enterprises were even given incentives as members of 
enterprise management teams. Therefore, in SOEs, employees did not have an organization 
that could effectively represent them in wage negotiations. However, employees’ 
disadvantageous market power gave rise to an unexpected favorable condition enabling the 
smooth progress of PRC labor market reform; namely, maintenance of slow wage growth in 
the first stage and employment restructuring in the second stage. At the same time, this 
disadvantage is also a hidden trigger to increasing income disparity within cities. 
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Nevertheless, in private enterprises, leaders of trade unions are primarily paid employees, 
who do not have powers to bargain with employers. 
Regional competition in the PRC is also an important factor in the maintenance of relatively 
slow wage growth. Interregional competition is considered as an important factor in the 
success of the PRC’s economic reform (Qian and Weingast 1997). When the central 
government evaluates the performance of local governments, it ranks them in terms of 
relative performance, and the promotion of local government officials is based on local GDP 
growth during their incumbency (Li and Zhou 2005). Such a mode of competition, where 
officials report to their superiors and not their local residents, induces local government 
officials to care more about local GDP growth by attracting investment, not employees’ rights 
and income disparity.  
Rural-to-urban migration and labor market competition are basic sources of low labor costs. 
Furthermore, the reform of the exchange rate system in 1994 contributed a lot to the export-
led growth pattern. Since 1978 when reform and the open door policy was first initiated, and 
with the gradual marketization of the trade regime, the overvalued yuan faced increased 
depreciation pressure. Though several adjustments had been made in the same period, the 
yuan was still overvalued and there was a huge gap between the official and illegal black 
market exchange rates. This dual system was abolished in 1994, and the official exchange 
rate was lowered tremendously once and for all. From then on, the exchange rate of the 
yuan to the USD remained steady until 2005 (see Figure 14). The great depreciation of the 
yuan was a starting point of the PRC’s export-oriented strategy, and has been responsible 
for the tremendous increase in exports since 1994.
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Note: Exchange rates are calculated as a weighted average of daily exchange rates of a year from 1979 to 2007. For 
2008, the year-end exchange rate is employed.  
Sources: China Commerce Yearbook (2008) and the website of National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Massive rural-to-urban migration, urban labor market reform, and the political governance 
structure have all created favorable conditions for slow wage growth in the presence of 
surplus labor, which, in addition to the undervalued yuan, have ensured that low labor costs, 
the main comparative advantage of the PRC, has been made use of. 
 
                                                  
13 Considering that the change of the exchange rate in 1994 was a unification of the dual-track exchange rates, 
the real size of the depreciation of the yuan was less than that shown in Figure 14. 
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4.  LABOR MARKET REFORM, INCOME DISPARITY, AND 
CONSEQUENCES 
Labor market reform has been aimed at both achieving better allocation of labor resources 
and providing incentives for the work force. However, for individuals, the initial result of labor 
market reform was to cause changes in employment status and income level. Upon a closer 
look, the two stages of labor market reform have had different influences on income 
disparity. 
The first stage of labor market reform mainly resulted in a gradual adjustment of employment 
and income structure. Before 1997, the growth of production per capita could roughly keep 
pace with the growth of wages per capita. Therefore, before the labor stock underwent a 
radical restructuring, the benefits of economic growth were shared by most workers. At the 
same time, marketization reform increased the rate of return to human capital, which had 
been distorted under the planned economy. Many empirical studies have found that in the 
process of the PRC’s reform and opening up, the return to education has been continuously 
rising (Li and Ding 2003; Li and Heckman 2004; Zhang et al. 2005). Therefore, in the first 
stage of labor market reform, the increase in income disparity was related mainly to the fact 
that the once-distorted return to human capital was being adjusted to normal. To sum up, 
labor market reform in the first stage caused people to “get rich together,” although some 
people got richer more quickly. 
In the second stage, after 1996, employment restructuring became more radical. The 
employment status of workers was differentiated, the labor force participation rate decreased 
continuously, and the unemployment rate rose quickly. If we take a look at the PRC’s urban 
unemployment rate, we can see that the registered unemployment rate of urban areas rose 
continuously after 1997 (Figure 12). Along with radical employment restructuring—and also 
because of the increase in income disparity between employed workers and laid-off 
workers—income disparity within cities also increased. Some of the laid-off workers fell into 
poverty in the cities (Meng et al. 2005). To sum up, the second stage of labor market reform 
brought people “structural differentiation,” in the process of which income disparity further 
increased. 
As argued in the previous section, although the radical change in the labor market in the 
mid-1990s has successfully helped establish the growth pattern, based on low labor costs 
and high exports, labor’s market position has also been weakened because of the enhanced 
market competition. As income inequality enlarged, labor’s share of national income has 
been declining since 1996 (Figure 15). 
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1. Income included in GDP consists of employee compensation, net taxes on production, depreciation of fixed assets, 
and operating surplus. We define labor’s share of total income as the employee compensation in the GDP 
calculations. The national labor’s share is a weighted average of each province’s labor’s share. 
2. In PRC statistics, income from self-employment is included in labor income, but in most other countries it’s partly 
calculated as capital income. The PRC adjust this according to international standards in 2004. So PRC’s labor share 
of national income is over-estimated compared with international standards before 2003. 
Sources: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook (1988-2008), and the authors’ calculations. 
Being at the forefront of economic globalization, the labor market reform in the PRC has 
catered to the needs of globalization and led to the economy’s constant utilization of the 
comparative advantage of low prices and the high quality of its labor force. At the same time, 
however, the increase in income disparity is a side effect of labor market reform. As the 
PRC’s labor market reform takes place in an increasingly globalized and open environment, 
the pricing of capital and knowledge is carried out at the global level. In contrast, laborers, 
especially unskilled workers, cannot move freely across country borders, so they may only 
compete with each other within the domestic market. However, in the PRC, there is still a 
substantial supply of unskilled labor, and the pricing of such labor is carried out on the 
competitive labor market. To this day, given the institutional background of the 
competitiveness of the labor market, the weakness of trade unions, and competition among 
local governments, laborers lack protection of their rights. In the process of globalization, 
there is an unprecedented combination of capital and knowledge at the international level, 
whereas laborers are in a comparatively disadvantageous position. If the basic institutional 
system of the PRC’s labor market does not change, it will be hard to relieve the increasing 
income disparity within a short period of time. Opening up the economy benefits urban areas 
more than their rural counterparts, and, therefore, income disparity between urban and rural 
areas is increased in the process of opening up (Lu and Chen 2004; 2006; Lu, Chen, and 
Wan 2005; Wan, Lu, and Chen 2006). Empirical studies on regional income disparity show 
that the opening-up process of the economy benefits coastal areas more than their inland 
counterparts. Globalization, with foreign direct investment and international trade as proxy 
variables, contributes nearly 20% of income inequality among regions, and this contribution 
has steadily increased (Wan, Chen, and Lu 2007). 
The negative consequences of rising income inequality have been seriously ignored before 
the current crisis, because the PRC seemed to be so successful in terms of high economic 
growth. During 2003 to 2007, the PRC had five successive years with annual growth over 
10%. However, when developed countries lost their purchasing power in the crisis, without 
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other sources of demand to digest its production overcapacity, the PRC’s high growth could 
no longer be sustained.  
Furthermore, rising income disparity could harm an economy’s growth potential in both 
short- and long-run, as an extensive literature has confirmed both theoretically and 
empirically. Generally speaking, there are four channels through which economic growth 
may be impeded by rising income disparity. First, because of imperfections in credit markets, 
a widening income inequality would increase the number of poor who face credit constraints, 
and therefore, lead to a decline in physical and human capital investment by them (see 
Galor and Zeira 1993; Fishman and Simhon 2002). Second, in a democratic society, a larger 
income disparity would create more proponents of redistributional policies which ask for 
higher taxes, while higher taxes provide negative incentives for economic growth. This 
branch of literature is represented by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini 
(1994), and Benabou (1996). In addition, a larger income inequality would bring about social 
and political unrest, deteriorate the investment environment, and hence lead to an increased 
allocation of resources to property protection and a decline in the accumulation of productive 
physical capital (Benhabib and Rustichini 1996). Finally, low-income families generally have 
a higher fertility rate and lower investment in human capital. So, with the enlarging income 
disparity and hence an increase in the number and proportion of low-income families, the 
economy’s total education level declines, and economic growth may be jeopardized (De la 
Croix and Doepke 2004). 
Studies concerning the PRC have confirmed the negative influence of income inequality on 
growth. Using farm-household level panel data for four rural provinces in the PRC, Ravallion 
(1998) confirmed that initial wealth inequality had a significant negative effect on both the 
household consumption growth and the country’s growth rate in mean consumption. 
Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2006) examine the relationship between inequality and 
economic growth using village-level panel data compiled from a large-scale, detailed 
household survey in the PRC. They also find initial inequality is negatively related to 
subsequent household income growth. Also, a study by Wan, Lu, and Chen (2006) finds that 
inequality in the PRC is quickly detrimental to investment, although inequality slightly 
promotes the accumulation of human capital. However, the negative effect of inequality on 
investment outweighs its positive effect on education. Therefore, the cumulative effect of 
inequality on growth is negative. It can be concluded from their empirical results that if the 
urban-rural per capita income ratio is lowered by one percentage point, then the growth rate 
would be 3.8 percentage points higher.  
Apart from influences on economic growth, income disparity also has other negative effects 
on development. As Figure 16 implies, inequality may be accompanied by social unrest and 
crime. More concretely, the urban-rural per capita income ratio and property infringement 
cases have similar trends throughout the post-reform years. 
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Note: Urban and rural incomes have been deflated by urban and rural CPIs, respectively, except for the years of 
1981 to 1984, and 1986 to 1989, because of a lack of CPI data in these years. 
Sources: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook (1988-2008) and the authors’ calculations.  
The existing literature has also confirmed the relationship between poverty reduction and 
income inequality. Using data from Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces in the PRC, Zhang, 
Huang, and Rozelle (2003) find that changes in the poverty rate can be mostly explained by 
economic growth, and that economic growth is vital for poverty reduction. However, poverty 
alleviation policies in the PRC have had almost no effect. Yao, Hanmer, and Zhang (2004) 
find that poverty can be significantly affected by inequality. According to their estimate, for 
PRC urban areas, poverty would rise by about 15% or 30%, depending on whether the high 
or low poverty line were used, if the Gini coefficient were to increase by 10%. The 
corresponding increases in rural poverty would be approximately 21% and 35%, 
respectively, which implies that poverty ratio is more sensitive to income distribution in rural 
areas than it is in urban areas. 
Inequality may also influence a person’s health. Using individual data from the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), Li and Zhu (2006) discovered an inverse-U correlation 
between self-reported health status and income inequality. Their results also show that rising 
inequality could increase the probability of one’s engaging in health-compromising behavior, 
such as smoking and alcohol abuse. Similarly, Feng and Yu (2007) also find an inverse-U 
correlation between income inequality and health in rural areas of the PRC.  
Some more interesting studies relate happiness and public trust to income inequality. Using 
2002 Chinese Household Income Project Survey data, Jiang, Lu, and Sato (2008) examine 
the effect on individual’s self-reported status of happiness posed by identity related 
inequality. Their empirical results reveal that compared to urban residents, migrants without 
urban household registration (hukou) suffer more from the average income gap between 
groups with and without local urban household registration (hukou). Lu and Zhang (2008) 
show some evidence that income inequality at the village level is detrimental to public trust in 
rural areas of the PRC, but their finding is not robust if using different measurements of 
inequality. 
In addition to the fact that income inequality is harmful to economic growth, income mobility 
also falls when income disparity increases. Using China Health and Nutrition Survey data, 
Ding and Wang (2005) measure the income mobility of households in the PRC from 1989 to 
2000. Their findings imply that income mobility in the PRC has been maintained at a 
relatively high level during these eleven years, compared with the measured income mobility 
in Belgium, Germany, and the US reported in Kerm (2004). These positive results may 
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explain why stability in PRC and the US is not undermined by serious social crises although 
income inequalities in both countries are statistically high. However, if nonmarket factors, 
such as social and political power, are embedded in the newly-grown market, income 
mobility in the PRC could decline. This unfavorable trend has already been revealed in 
Wang (2005) and deserves greater attention. Using data from the PRC in the period from 
1989 to 1997, Wang shows that, though the overall income mobility helps to equalize the 
income distribution among households in all periods, this effect declined significantly in the 
1990s, which implies a decrease in income mobility. 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS: RESTRUCTURING THE 
TRIANGLE FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 
The shocks that the current economic crisis have brought to the PRC economy can be 
largely explained by its export-oriented strategy and high savings ratio. The economy’s 
dependence on exports is induced by low labor costs, whereas the high savings ratio is 
derived from the widening income inequality. Both of these phenomena resulted from the 
labor market reform began in the 1980s and accelerated in the mid-1990s. If we divide labor 
market reform into two stages, taking the mass lay-off and separation of surplus employees 
in SOEs in 1996 as the turning point, the PRC’s economic growth pattern can also be 
roughly separated into two stages. In the first stage, although people’s income sources were 
diversified, economic growth mainly benefited from market competition, while the labor 
market reform was slow and gradual to avoid social unrest. In the second stage, 
employment restructuring was much more radical, when massive numbers of redundant 
workers were separated from SOEs. The labor market reform further intensified competition, 
promoted efficiency, but also aggravated income disparity. At the same time, since the mid-
1990s, rural-to-urban migration has increased significantly and provided sufficient low-cost 
laborers to labor-intensive industries. When globalization meets urbanization in the PRC, 
labor’s market power has been weakened, with the result that the PRC, as in many countries 
globally, saw labor’s share of national income decline. The PRC’s growth path—with high 
levels of both growth and inequality—has been seriously challenged by the current economic 
crisis, compounding the prospect of increases in income disparity that would jeopardize 
investment growth and further thwart overall economic growth. 
Drawing a triangle between labor market reform, income distribution and economic growth, 
as in Figure 17, we can see that PRC is currently at the first triangle; namely, where labor 
market reform directly enhances economic growth, yet at the same time exacerbates income 
inequality, and the enlarging income disparity hinders economic growth. If labor market 
reform strategy were wisely adjusted, income disparity could be effectively narrowed, and 
labor market reform would be beneficial to and promote the final objective of economic 
growth. Through this reform, the economic growth pattern would be transformed from 
depending on low labor costs to promoting productivity and social harmony. The present 
economic crisis is just a stimulus for such transformation. Although institutional forces that 
aggravate income distribution are still at work, restructuring this triangular relationship 
should, nevertheless, be a policy goal of the PRC Government in order to establish a 
harmonious society and to sustain economic growth. The New Labor Contract Law, which 
forced the employers to sign contracts with and provide social security to their employees, 
has been implemented in the beginning of 2008. Adopting a law that increased costs on the 
eve of the crisis aroused heated disputes in the PRC. The implementation of the New Labor 
Contract Law has led to increases in labor costs in production. This could force the growth of 
the PRC economy to depend less on exports and more on domestic consumption demand, 
and is beneficial for sustainable economic growth according to the logic in our article. 
However, the law has also been intensely criticized. In our view, it is only the timing of the 
law that is to be doubted, because it was carried out at the beginning of 2008, on the eve of 
the crisis hitting the PRC economy, and this has imposed great pressure on PRC 
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enterprises, especially those relying heavily on exports. However, if looking at the 
institutional change against the background of the PRC development path, the New Labor 
Contract Law might also be a symbol of the PRC’s change in its growth pattern. 
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